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A common finding across many cultures has been that religious people behave
more prosocially than less (or non-) religious people. Numerous priming studies have
demonstrated that the activation of religious concepts via implicit and explicit cues
(e.g., ‘God,’ ‘salvation,’ among many others) increases prosociality in religious people.
However, the factors underlying such findings are less clear. In this review we discuss
hypotheses (e.g., the supernatural punishment hypothesis) that explain the religion-
prosociality link, and also how recent findings in the empirical literature converge to
suggest that the divine rewards (e.g., heaven) and punishments (e.g., hell) promised by
various religious traditions may play a significant role. In addition, we further discuss
inconsistencies in the religion-prosociality literature, as well as existing and future
psychological studies which could improve our understanding of whether, and how,
concepts of divine rewards and punishments may influence prosociality.
Keywords: religion, psychology, priming, morality, prosociality, reward, punishment
INTRODUCTION
Among the most heated debates in moral philosophy is that between religious and non-religious
people as to what constitutes ‘the good life’, and whether atheism or theism offers a sounder basis
for ethics and morality (Craig, 2010; Law, 2011; Grayling, 2013). Theists often argue that godless
worldviews provide no objective foundation for moral virtue (Craig, 2010), and that immorality
and hedonism are likely consequences (Zacharias, 2004; Warren, 2014). However, many humanists
have rebutted that the moral foundations of religion are, at least in part, rooted in self-interest. It is
argued that theistic morality is confounded by the promise of divine rewards (e.g., eternal bliss) and
punishments (e.g., eternal torment) as recompense for behaving in particular ways, and thus, that
there is a hedonistic element inherent in religious morality (Stenger, 2011). This is an interesting
objection, and there is a growing body of research that seems to support it, which we examine
below.
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PROSOCIALITY AND RELIGION
On the face of it, the claim of theologians and religious
apologists seems to hold true. Numerous investigations have
found that religious people behave more morally/prosocially1
than less (or non-) religious people. For example, in a large-
scale study spanning over 70 countries, Stavrova and Siegers
(2014) found that personal religiosity correlated positively with
membership in charitable organizations. In fact, this effect was
most pronounced in non-theocratic contexts; that is, contexts
within which religious morals are not legally or socially enforced.
Stavrova and Siegers (2014) also found that personal religiosity
correlated negatively with the frequency of traffic offenses, the
probability of purchasing stolen goods, and the probability of
justifying the act of lying for a personal gain. It seems the more
secular a society is, the greater the moral gap between more
and less religious people is. Numerous other studies have also
demonstrated links between personal religiosity and prosocial
behavior (e.g., Regnerus et al., 1998; Saroglou et al., 2005;
Heineck, 2014).
Priming studies contribute further evidence that religious
people behave more prosocially than less (or non-) religious
people. When reminded of God, or when primed with words
relevant to God or religion, religious people have been found
to behave more prosocially in anonymous economic games
(Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007), to cheat less if they believe
in punitive/vengeful deities (Shariff and Norenzayan, 2011),
report greater ‘public self-awareness’ (Gervais and Norenzayan,
2012), and respond more socially desirably, that is, in ways
which provide unrealistically positive information about oneself
(Gervais and Norenzayan, 2012), among other such findings. In
a recent meta-analysis, Shariff et al. (2016) found that while the
effects of religious primes reliably increased the prosociality of
people rated as being high in religiosity, such primes did not
reliably affect less (or non-) religious people, suggesting that the
effects of these primes were indeed due to their religious content.
While the religion-prosociality link makes sense, and many
studies have found supporting evidence for it, the literature has
not been one-sided. Galen (2012) provided a comprehensive
critique of the state of research exploring the relationship
between religious beliefs and prosociality. Galen noted that
many studies exploring the religion-prosociality link have failed
to find differences between religious and irreligious people
(e.g., Bellemare and Kröger, 2007). Galen also noted that
many studies have failed to distinguish between agnosticism,
low/nominal religiosity, and irreligiosity; often combining these
into a single group (e.g., ‘low religiosity’), which makes accurate
comparisons of the prosocial attitudes/behaviors or religious and
irreligious people difficult. Galen also showed that equivalent
secular (e.g., ‘civil’) and religious (e.g., ‘divine’) primes identically
1The terms ‘morality’ and ‘prosociality’ are often used interchangeably in the
literature. Prosociality has largely been broken down into two distinct constructs:
prosocial attitudes and prosocial behaviors. Prosocial attitudes are those which
reflect a desire and willingness to help others. Prosocial behaviors are those
which benefit/help others (regardless of the motivation; hence, such behaviors are
not necessarily ‘moral’). For clarity and consistency, this paper tends to refer to
prosociality, instead of morality.
influence prosociality (e.g., see Gervais and Norenzayan, 2012,
Experiment 1; Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; Harrell, 2012;
Yilmaz and Bahçekapili, 2016), which suggests that religion per se
is not the underlying cause of the increased prosociality; rather,
religion exerts its effects indirectly, via its appeal to simpler
cognitive and affective mechanisms (discussed below).
Despite his many concerns with the religion-prosociality
literature, Galen (2012, p. 885) concluded that the evidence
seems “fairly conclusive that priming religious concepts activates
prosocial behaviors in participants”. However, the effectiveness
of religious primes in promoting prosociality has also been
questioned. While many studies have found a positive effect of
religious priming on prosociality, others have failed to find a
consistent effect. For example, Benjamin et al. (2010) failed to
find an effect of religious priming on prosociality in the Dictator
Game (in which individual players split a sum of money between
themselves and a second player), and found that religious primes
only led to increased contributions in a ‘public goods game’ (in
which players are given a sum of money and can contribute
some of that money to a public pot; the money in the pot is
then multiplied and distributed equally across all participants,
regardless of their personal contributions) from Protestants, but
not Catholics, whose contributions actually decreased.
In their meta-analysis, Shariff et al. (2016) explored whether
the religion-prosociality link was robust, after accounting for
publication bias. While Shariff et al. (2016) found the link
to be robust after controlling for publication bias, van Elk
et al. (2016) obtained mixed results. Van Elk et al. (2016)
tested the robustness of the religion-prosociality link using two
distinct meta-analytic techniques: the Precision-Effect Testing–
Precision-Effect-Estimate with Standard Error (PET-PEESE)
technique (see Stanley, 2005; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007),
and the Bayesian Bias Correction (BBC) technique (see Guan and
Vandekerckhove, 2016). Only the latter demonstrated a robust
effect of religion on prosociality. Accordingly, van Elk et al.
(2016) concluded that meta-analytic techniques are useful, but
have proven insufficient to settle the debate surrounding the
religion-prosociality link. Hence, this is an area of continuing
debate.
Another issue in the literature is that many religious priming
studies have yielded antisocial effects (Galen, 2012). For example,
Johnson et al. (2010) found that participants subliminally primed
with Christian religious words displayed more covert racial
prejudice and negative emotion toward African Americans than
participants exposed to neutral primes. Another relevant finding
in the literature (discussed in detail below) was that belief in
a benevolent, forgiving and merciful God seemed to positively
correlate with frequency of cheating on a quiz task (Shariff
and Norenzayan, 2011). Using a variant form of the Dictator
Game (involving allocation of stickers, rather than money),
Decety et al. (2015) found that children from more religious
families were significantly less generous than children from less
religious or nonreligious families. Furthermore, despite the fact
that children from religious families are expected to learn more
about their religion as they age, older children from religious
households in this study behaved more selfishly than younger
children from religious households. Given these results, it may
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be more accurate to claim that religion seems to make people
more prosocial in some instances, and more antisocial in others.
Given the heterogeneity of specific beliefs across varying religious
traditions, we should also expect to see variation in the effects
of religious primes across religious traditions (Galen, 2012; also
see Aveyard, 2014). If one religion claims that stealing from the
wealthy is acceptable, and another dogmatically declares that
theft is never acceptable, would a religious prime affect people
from these two religions identically in a scenario which involved
stealing from the wealthy to aid the poor?
While there is certainly a vast body of literature exploring
what the differences may be between religious and less (or non-)
religious people around the world in terms of prosocial attitudes
and behaviors, such findings provide very limited insight into
why such differences are often observed. If there is a link between
religious belief and prosociality, then there must be an underlying
reason for this. Stavrova and Siegers (2014) appealed to self-
determination theory (see Deci and Ryan, 2000) to explain their
findings, suggesting that the increased prosociality of religious
people in more liberal contexts may be explained by the facts
that (1) religions place a very heavy emphasis on morality and
prosociality, and (2) “individuals are generally more committed
to values (in this case, religious values) and tasks that they deem
to be personally chosen rather than imposed by others” (Stavrova
and Siegers, 2014, pp. 315−316). Religious texts certainly do
promote prosociality (though they certainly also promote some
antisocial attitudes and behaviors; e.g., Deuteronomy 20:10−14,
22:23−24; Ephesians 5:22−24; Qur’an 5:51, 9:5), but why do
religious people adopt religious moral values in the first place?
What is it about our religious traditions that makes them so
morally persuasive?
PREDOMINANT HYPOTHESES
Numerous hypotheses have been proposed to explain the
apparent link between religious beliefs and prosociality. One such
hypothesis is the ‘supernatural monitoring hypothesis’ (SMH),
which posits that god-concepts may activate social systems in
the human brain which could make believers feel as though they
are being watched (Atkinson and Bourrat, 2011; also see Boyer,
2002). There are numerous studies demonstrating that being
watched – or believing you are being watched – increases the
likelihood of prosocial behaviors (e.g., Piazza et al., 2011; Nettle
et al., 2013; Takagishi et al., 2015). If moral transgressions are
observed, the observers may inform others, which could damage
the reputation of the transgressor (Piazza and Bering, 2008;
Shariff et al., 2014). Maintenance of one’s reputation provides a
powerful incentive for prosocial behavior (Milinski et al., 2002;
Piazza and Bering, 2008), and most of the world’s religions posit
the existence of supernatural agents who constantly observe and
judge our actions. According to the SMH, belief in such agents
motivates religious people to behave prosocially (Boyer, 2002;
Gervais and Norenzayan, 2012).
A related hypothesis is the ‘supernatural punishment
hypothesis’ (SPH; see Johnson and Krüger, 2004; Johnson and
Bering, 2006; Johnson, 2016). Proponents of the SPH argue that
large-scale human cooperation (e.g., in large societies) is difficult
to explain via appeal to concepts like kin altruism/selection, and
direct/indirect reciprocity, and suggest that the emergence of
beliefs in punitive supernatural agents, whether these arose as
adaptations or exaptations, may better explain the data (Johnson,
2016; Yilmaz and Bahçekapili, 2016). If invisible, morally
interested supernatural agents exist, they could be watching us
at any time without our awareness. Indeed, the God of today’s
main monotheisms apparently watches and judges all of us at all
times (e.g., Job 34:21; Qur’an 49:18). If these agents are able to
punish transgressors in this life or the next, it would be unwise
to transgress, and on this basis, religious belief may promote
prosociality (Johnson, 2005). Unlike the SMH (which pertains to
reputation-management and social awareness), the SPH posits
that the monitoring of supernatural agents will be particularly
effective in promoting prosociality if those agents have the power
to punish transgressors on earth (e.g., by making crops fail) or in
the afterlife.
The SMH and SPH are not mutually exclusive, as reputation
management and fear of punishment could concomitantly
promote prosociality. Nor are these hypotheses the only
possibilities. Harrell (2012) suggests that the reward-related
aspects of religion can promote prosociality (this could be
referred to as the ‘supernatural reward hypothesis’, or SRH).
There are also hypotheses that are not centerd on the monitoring,
generosity or punishments of supernatural agents. For example,
some have argued that engagement in particular religious rituals
acts as a costly signal which suggests to other adherents that the
signaller can be trusted, as he/she belongs to the same group as
them, and will endure great costs to demonstrate it (Irons, 2001;
Sosis, 2004). For example, Jains will often spend considerable
time carefully sweeping the paths in front of them to ensure they
do not step/sit on any insects (Dundas, 2002), and Muslims will
fast from sunrise until sunset during the month of Ramadan.
Humans have an innate tendency toward coalitional thinking
(Saad, 2011; Buss, 2014), and have been found to bond and
cooperate on the basis of arbitrary and/or trivial similarities, often
at the expense of outgroup members (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971;
also see Traulsen, 2008). This account may explain why religious
prosociality has commonly been found only to extend to religious
in-group members (see Galen, 2012).
Ultimately, prosocial behavior stems from multiple factors
(Shariff et al., 2016), so it is unlikely that any single hypothesis
will provide a comprehensive account of the religion-prosociality
link. The empirical literature provides particular support for the
SMH and SPH, and limited support (our literature search only
located one such study: Harrell, 2012) for the SRH. This evidence
will be explored below.
DIVINE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS
“Honor your father and your mother, so that you may live long in
the land the Lord your God is giving you”.
– Exodus 20:12 [NIV]
“For them who have done good is the best [reward] and extra.
No darkness will cover their faces, nor humiliation. Those are
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companions of Paradise; they will abide therein eternally”.
– Qur’an 10:26 [Sahih International Translation]
“Moses said to the people, ‘Do not be afraid. God has come to test
you, so that the fear of God will be with you to keep you from
sinning”.
– Exodus 20:20 [NIV]
“Indeed, those who devour the property of orphans unjustly are
only consuming into their bellies fire. And they will be burned in
a Blaze”.
– Qur’an 4:10 [Sahih International Translation]
There is a sound case to be made that if the observed
differences between more religious and less (or non-) religious
people are genuine, then they may derive – at least in part –
from the fact that most religious traditions promise that moral
behavior will be divinely rewarded, and immoral behaviors
will be harshly punished (Johnson and Krüger, 2004; Harris,
2006; Baumard and Boyer, 2013; Johnson, 2016; Yilmaz and
Bahçekapili, 2016). This is not to suggest that reward-anticipation
and punishment-avoidance can completely account for why
more and less (or non-) religious people differ in terms of
prosociality (see above). The argument here is simply that
reward-anticipation and fear of punishment form part of the
overall picture, as to why religious people and less (or non-)
religious people differ in terms of prosocial attitudes and
behaviors, and recent findings in the literature (e.g., Harrell,
2012; Yilmaz and Bahçekapili, 2016; explored below) support this
claim.
Given the preponderance of promises of divine rewards and
punishments in today’s predominant monotheistic religions (i.e.,
all sects of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam), it is unsurprising
that religion has commonly been linked to prosociality. Moral
reciprocity – reward for moral behavior and punishment for
immoral behavior – is a common theme in the vast majority of the
world’s religions (Boyer, 2002; Johnson, 2005; Laurin et al., 2012;
Hartberg et al., 2014). While believers may not recall specific
scriptural verses regarding divine rewards and punishments for
particular behaviors, the overarching message would be simpler
to learn/internalize. The public statements of many popular
religious apologists demonstrate the pervasiveness of this theme
of moral reciprocity in religion. For example:
“The Bible teaches that our time on earth is essentially preparation
for eternity. . . This life is like a warm-up act, a dress rehearsal, for
the real show in eternity. Once we fully grasp this, it makes all the
difference in the world, affecting our choices, values, relationships,
goals, and how we use our time and resources”.
(Warren, 2009, p. 10)
Here is another example which conspicuously links religious
morality to the anchor of eternity:
“Virtually all conceptions of life after death, especially the religious
conceptions, are rooted in the idea of cosmic justice. . . In all these
doctrines, life after death is not a mere continuation of earthly
existence, but rather a different kind of existence based on a settling
of earthly accounts. These theories hold that even though we don’t
always find terrestrial justice, there is ultimate justice. In this future
accounting, what goes around does come around”.
(D’Souza, 2009, p. 180).
It must be noted that religions vary in their precepts and
injunctions greatly. Though not the focus of this paper, many
Eastern religious systems (e.g., Buddhism and Jainism) appear
to be much more selfless and benign than the predominant
monotheisms of the West (though the vast majority of research
in the field has focused on Christianity and Islam). While books
like the Qur’an and the Old Testament are filled with references
to divinely sanctioned violence, and the entitlement of certain
chosen people to the belongings and labor of others, Buddhism
and Jainism promote non-violence (e.g., Jains will even cover
their mouths to lessen the chance that they will accidentally
kill insects by swallowing them), open-mindedness, and self-
discovery through meditation (Long, 2009; Harris, 2014). Despite
this, concepts like karma and reincarnation still suggest a ‘give
and get returned’ element of morality (D’Souza, 2009). Hence, it is
likely that the promise of good karma and the threat of bad karma
would promote moral behavior. Just as believing that immoral
people are reincarnated as cockroaches would provide a powerful
incentive for moral behavior. Indeed, Johnson (2016, p. 49)
argued that the concept of karma may be particularly potent
in promoting prosociality because karma is “embedded into the
fabric of the universe”. That is, karma is a matter of absolute cause
and effect, whereby moral actions lead to more positive outcomes,
and negative actions lead to negative outcomes. Karma is not
controlled by the whims of a forgiving and merciful deity; it is
essentially a kind of supernaturalistic cause and effect.
The link between divine rewards/punishments and
prosociality certainly makes theoretical sense, but now there is a
growing body of empirical literature supporting the notion that
such divine incentives do influence prosociality.
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES
There is a vast body of literature exploring the effects of implicit
and explicit religious primes on prosociality (Shariff et al., 2016).
However, one problem with the priming literature has been that
the different primes being used, while all similar in that they are
linked to religion (e.g., ‘heaven,’ ‘hell,’ ‘Jesus,’ ‘priest’), may also be
different enough to produce different effects (Preston and Ritter,
2013). For example, ‘hell’ primes may elicit fear responses, while
‘heaven’ primes may improve mood or relieve anxiety. So while a
pool of ‘religious primes’ may increase prosociality, it is difficult
to isolate which specific primes (if not all) are underlying this
effect.
The notion that related, but distinct, religious primes can have
markedly different effects on prosocial behaviors and attitudes
is supported by recent findings. Harrell (2012) found that
reward-related secular (e.g., ‘applause,’ ‘admire’) or religious (e.g.,
‘heaven,’ ‘salvation’) primes increased generosity in the Dictator
Game significantly more than did neutral secular (e.g., ‘tree,’
‘ocean’) or religious (e.g., ‘covenant,’ ‘temple’) primes. It seems
plausible and likely that this effect occurred because the reward-
related primes stimulated reward-anticipation in participants.
However, one could also argue that this effect was due to the
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fact that the reward-related primes contained positive content,
and that this altered the participants’ moods. Indeed, Pichon
et al. (2007) found that religious primes with positive content
(e.g., ‘bless,’ ‘praise’) increased prosocial intentions more than
neutral religious words (e.g., ‘Bible,’ ‘parish’). However, many
of the positive religious words in Pichon et al.’s (2007) study
were relevant to divine rewards (e.g., ‘heaven,’ ‘salvation’), making
their results difficult to interpret. Furthermore, all words used as
primes by Harrell (2012) had been rated as being equally positive
in a preliminary study; hence, it is more likely that the effects
observed were due to reward-related content in primes, and were
not due to positive content2.
Divine punishment primes have also been found to have a
positive impact on prosociality. With a predominantly Muslim
sample, Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016) found that participants
primed with punishment-related religious and secular words
(e.g., ‘devil’ and ‘prison’, respectively) reported more prosocial
intentions than did participants primed with non-punishing
religious and secular words (e.g., ‘spirit’ and ‘democracy’,
respectively).3 In another study, Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016)
found that participants who read sections of Qur’anic text
related to divine punishment reported more prosocial intentions
than did participants who read sections of Qur’anic text
which highlighted Allah’s forgiveness and mercy. Hadnes and
Schumacher (2012) also found evidence supporting the SPH in
a sample from Burkina Faso. Participants who were primed with
traditional beliefs and references to supernatural punishment
(such punishments feature prominently in many traditional
African belief systems; Hadnes and Schumacher, 2012) behaved
more prosocially in the Trust Game (see Berg et al., 1995) relative
to control participants. These results suggest that fear of divine
punishment can motivate prosocial behavior.
This idea is supported by two studies conducted by Shariff
and Norenzayan (2011), who found that participants’ views of
God as either loving and caring, or angry and vengeful, were
useful predictors of honesty in anonymous settings. Participants’
ratings of God as ‘forgiving,’ ‘kind,’ ‘gentle,’ and so on, correlated
positively with the number of times they cheated during a
mathematical quiz task (providing further evidence against the
notion that positive aspects of religion promote prosociality);
whereas participants’ ratings of God as ‘punishing,’ ‘vengeful,’
‘terrifying,’ and so on, correlated negatively with the number
of times they cheated. These effects were found regardless of
whether participants rated the attributes of God before or after
completing the quiz task, eliminating the possibility that ratings
of God (i.e., as ‘kind’ vs. ‘vengeful’) were dependent on prior
cheating during the quiz task.
2It is also worth noting that Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016; reviewed below) used a
list of largely positive religious words (e.g., ‘grace’, ‘mercy’, ‘heaven’) in their pool
of non-punishing religious primes. Non-punishing primes did not significantly
increase prosocial intentions. In their second study, reading collections of Qur’anic
verses which emphasized the positive and non-punitive qualities of Allah did not
increase prosociality. These findings contrast with the findings of Pichon et al.
(2007).
3It should be noted that, in study 1, Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016) did not utilise
Bonferroni corrections to their alpha-criterion for multiple comparisons, and so
there is an increased chance of a type 1 error. This should be considered when
interpreting their results.
Taken together, these findings suggest that reward-
anticipation and fear of punishment play roles in motivating the
prosocial attitudes and behaviors of religious people. The findings
of Harrell (2012) and Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016) suggest
that, even if only at the subconscious level, participants register
the reward-relevance and punishment-relevance of certain
religious words, and this influences their subsequent prosocial
attitudes/behaviors. As was noted above, categorising primes is
a difficult task, as there is likely to be considerable conceptual
overlap (e.g., the word ‘salvation’ is positive and reward-related).
Notably, Ritter and Preston (2013) demonstrated that people
distinguish between words referring to religious agents, religious
institutions (e.g., ‘church,’ ‘sermon,’ ‘baptism’), and more abstract
religious concepts (e.g., ‘holy,’ ‘heaven,’ ‘faith’). Not enough
words in the 32-word list provided to participants by Ritter and
Preston pertained to reward or punishment, though ‘heaven’,
‘soul’, ‘miracle’, and ‘salvation’ appeared to cluster somewhat
closely together, suggesting an underlying relation – arguably,
their relevance to divine reward – between these terms.
Aside from the more direct investigations of the effects of
divine-reward and divine punishment on prosocial behaviors,
there are other findings worth citing which may add more
indirect support for this notion. Kupor et al. (2015) found that
priming people with notions of ‘God’ led to increased risk-
taking when such risks were amoral (involved no moral/immoral
content), but also that risk-taking behavior decreased when
such risks involved immorality. Possibly there is an element of
reciprocity here, whereby religious people expect God to give
them good fortunes, in return for moral behavior (for a more
expansive account of the idea of reciprocity in relationships with
supernatural beings, see Boyer, 2002). Given that most religions
warn of punishments for immoral behavior, it is unsurprising
that participants were less willing to take immoral risks, and this
makes sense in light of the SPH.
These data converge to lend support to the SPH and also
to the notion that divine rewards might also be influential in
the promotion of prosociality (the SRH). However, more work
should be done to further investigate these hypotheses, using both
behavioral and neuroimaging methods.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Although there are numerous studies (a) on links between
prosocial behaviors and religion and (b) how divine rewards
and punishments may partly account for why religious people
behave more prosocially than less (or non-) religious people,
to our knowledge, there is a lack of studies empirically linking
these two streams. Furthermore, interpreting findings from some
priming studies can be difficult (e.g., note the distinct conclusions
of Pichon et al. (2007) and Harrell (2012); also see Preston
and Ritter (2013). Here, we suggest potential psychological
experiments, spanning vastly different methodologies, to probe
the relationships between prosociality and divine rewards and
punishments.
Firstly, as was suggested by van Elk et al. (2016), there
is a dire need for largescale replication studies exploring the
religion-prosociality link via the use of priming techniques. To
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reduce publication bias, van Elk et al. (2016) recommended
that future replication studies also be pre-registered; that is,
accepted for publication prior to the actual results of the study
being obtained, as this would help to address the ‘file drawer
problem’ (Rosenthal, 1979). The emphasis should always be on
testing hypotheses, not on confirming them. While numerous
priming studies have found links between religious devotion and
attitudinal/behavioral prosociality (e.g., Shariff and Norenzayan,
2007), others have failed to find a consistent effect (e.g., Benjamin
et al., 2010). Furthermore, the studies by Harrell (2012) and
Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016) featured sample sizes of less
than 160 people, and so these findings are in particular need of
largescale replication.
Future work exploring the religion-prosociality link must
also distinguish between irreligiosity and ‘low religiosity’ (see
Galen, 2012), as this has also been an area of conceptual
confusion, making the interpretation of the results of many
previous studies a difficult task. Future work should also
consider utilizing more diverse samples, exploring the religion-
prosociality link in Buddhists, Hindus, among others, rather
than relying overwhelmingly on Christian and Muslim samples
as being representative of ‘religion’ generally. Religions vary
considerably in their moral precepts and injunctions, and this
should translate into differences in prosocial attitudes and
behaviors. This can only be tested through studies utilizing
sufficiently large samples, and sufficiently diverse samples, to
allow for viable intergroup comparisons.
Future researchers should compare the effects of divine
reward and punishment primes to discern which form of divine
recompense is more influential when it comes to prosocial
behavior. Many in the field have predicted that punishment-
related religious primes would be more effective in promoting
prosociality, as punishments are generally more effective than
rewards in promoting prosociality (Johnson, 2005; Johnson and
Bering, 2006; Shariff, 2008). Indeed, research has found that
humans have what has been called a ‘negativity bias’; that is,
humans are generally more attentive to negative stimuli than
to positive stimuli (Baumeister et al., 2001; Johnson, 2016).
However, this has not been empirically tested with regard to
religious primes. Researchers could also examine whether divine
reward and punishment primes promote prosociality through
distinct avenues. This could be achieved, by priming one group
of participants with both ‘heaven’ and ‘hell’ concepts, and
comparing the effects on prosociality with those obtained from
groups primed with divine reward or punishment concepts.
If priming participants with both kinds of concept produces
a greater effect on prosociality, then this would suggest that
rewards and punishments influence prosociality via distinct
mechanisms.
Future work should also investigate whether divine
punishment primes cause fear. This can be accomplished
by measuring Galvanic Skin Response (GSR), which is defined as
a change in the electrical conductivity of the skin (i.e., with the
onset of the prime), and has been used extensively to measure
fear in psychological experiments (Williams et al., 2001).
Researchers could compare the effects of subliminal/implicit
primes relevant to supernatural punishments with neutral
religious primes, and primes relevant to supernatural agents
(e.g., ‘God,’ ‘Jesus,’ ‘Muhammad’) to see whether particular types
of primes produce different physiological effects. This would
provide further evidence for the notion that distinct kinds of
religious primes have distinct effects (Preston and Ritter, 2013).
Researchers could also test whether GSR in the agent-prime
condition is mediated by participants’ views of the relevant
religious agents (e.g., vengeful or merciful).
Finally, future research should utilize neuroimaging
techniques to increase our understanding of how/where primes
are having their effects. By using neuroimaging techniques,
we can examine patterns of neural activation during the
priming process. If reward-related religious primes truly are
promoting prosociality via the avenue of reward-anticipation,
then one would predict that participants exposed to such primes
would show increased activation in the ventral striatum and
orbitofrontal cortex, brain areas that have been repeatedly shown
to be activated in response to reward (Olds and Milner, 1954;
Young et al., 1998; Knutson and Cooper, 2005; Abe and Greene,
2014). If punishment-related religious primes are promoting
prosociality by making people fear divine punishment, one would
predict increased activity in the amygdala, a brain region that
has repeatedly been shown to activate in response to punishment
(LeDoux, 1993; Orsini and Maren, 2012; Moustafa et al., 2013).
If the expected findings are obtained, this would provide neural
evidence in support of current interpretations of the priming
data. However, if the expected findings were not obtained, then
perhaps we would need to re-evaluate how religious primes are
being categorized (e.g., ‘reward-related’ vs. ‘positive’). Or perhaps
null findings may reflect more on the shortcomings of particular
priming paradigms.
Researchers considering a neuroimaging approach to
exploring the effects of religious primes could explore the
effects of subliminal, implicit and/or explicit primes. While
subliminal primes have been found to be effective in eliciting
subcortical neural activity, subliminal lexical primes (e.g., words)
have tended to produce small effects (Brooks et al., 2012). It is
also worth noting that implicit priming has not always proven
effective in producing effects detectable by fMRI. For example,
Powers and Heatherton (2013) failed to find a priming effect at
the neural level using fMRI, despite using an implicit priming
paradigm (the ‘sentence unscrambling task’) which has often
been found to produce behavioral effects (e.g., see Sommer
and Baumeister, 2002; Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2003; Shariff and
Norenzayan, 2007; DeWall and Bushman, 2009; though also
see Doyen et al., 2012; Aveyard, 2014). Though null effects are
still meaningful, such findings in fMRI studies do not constitute
definitive proof that primes failed to produce effects. At best, we
could only conclude that if there actually was an effect, it was
not detectable using fMRI technology (Powers and Heatherton,
2013), which is still a valuable insight.
CONCLUSION
The explosion of studies exploring possible links between religion
and prosociality has given rise to a plethora of interesting
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hypotheses and controversies. Some means by which these
controversies could possibly be addressed have been outlined
(e.g., utilizing GSR to test for physiological effects of particular
religious primes). If religion truly does promote prosociality,
then there must be reasons for this. The SMH, SPH and SRH
make theoretical sense, and recent priming studies offer early
support for these hypotheses. However, there is much work
that needs to be done. These confirmatory findings should be
accepted tentatively until largescale – preferably pre-registered –
replications have been conducted. If these findings are replicated,
future researchers should conduct experiments (e.g., using
GSR or fMRI) aimed at uncovering how particular primes
are affecting participants. These insights may contribute to an
overall picture of how and why reward-related and punishment-
related religious primes influence prosocial behavior, if indeed
they do.
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